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CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION

ARTHUR

E.

SUTHERLAND*

Most constitutional questions arise from conflicts between two
wholesome aspirations, where one or the other must give way Our
eighteenth-century devotion to full freedom for criticism of conduct
of public business has persisted to the present day, notably illustrated
by the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in New York Times v Sullivan.1
The Court there held that even an untrue critical statement concerning a police commissioner's performance of his functions is
privileged against a libel action unless the statement is made with
"malice"-including willful or reckless misrepresentation. This
principle of press immunity runs head-on into another wholesome
and rightly cherished tradition-that a judicial proceeding, and
particularly a grave criminal prosection, is a solemn matter, in
which all questions of fact and law should be decided by a tribunal
guided only by admissible evidence of fact and detached judicial
learning and wisdom, not influenced by public excitement and
clamor This latter principle has most recently been illustrated by
the Supreme Court's June 6, 1966 opinion in Sheppard v Maxwell.2
The tribunal adopted the description of Dr Sheppard's trial for
murder given by the Ohio Supreme Court:
Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were
combined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue and
captivate the public fancy to a degree perhaps unparalleled
m recent annals. Throughout the premdictment investigation,
the subsequent legal skirmishes and the nine-week trial,
circulation-conscious editors catered to the insatiable interest
of the American public in the bizarre.
In this atmosphere of a "Roman holiday" for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life.
The United States Supreme Court held that Ohio had denied Dr
Sheppard due process of law by his murder trial and conviction
without "the judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was entitled."
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DEVELOPMENTS IN

CONTEMPT

Sheppard was not a novelty; Estes v Texas s was a similar case.
And in Rideau v Louisiana,4 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction of murder following a televised confession obtained by a
sheriff. Press, radio and television publicity, sensational in character, can interfere with fair and orderly trail. The United States
Supreme Court, in Rideau, Estes and Sheppard thus utilized the
remedy of upsetting the conviction where the publicity was intolerable. But this remedy does not stop the trouble at its source.
Is there any means of punishing instances of intolerable publicity
and so deterring it in cases which arise thereafter?
Our newspaper, radio and television friends protest at suggestions of contempt as a remedy, stressing "the public's right to
know " The Supreme Court of the United States has gone far toward eliminating contempt by publication in its 1941 decisions of
Bridges v California5 and Times-Mirror v Superior Court driven
7
home in 1946 in Pennekamp v Florida
and in 1947 by Craig v
Harney 1
But in 1950 Justice Frankfurter in his opinion concerning denial
of certiorari in Maryland v Baltimore Radio Show9 carefully pointed out that in England, the country where our doctrine of free press
was born, "trial by newspaper" is sharply restricted. Accounts of
public courtroom proceedings are admirably full and accurate, as
anyone will agree who read the London Times daily stories of Dr
Adams' trial for murder in 1956. But England's judges strictly punish newspaper statements of extra-judicial matters which could influence the decisions of the prosecution.
The Sheppard opinion seems to suggest that some control of
extra-]udicial statements made by public officers, including defense
counsel, prosecution counsel, and police, is still possible by use of
the contempt power And perhaps we can carry this idea still
further; if an organ of publicity collaborates with a public officer
in making statements for which the officer may be punished in
contempt proceedings, perhaps the newspaper or broadcaster, too,
may also be similarly disciplined in the interests of fair trial.
The opinion of the Court in Sheppard contains the following
language:
If publicity during the proceedings
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381 U.S. 532 (1965).
373 U.S. 723 (1963).
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
328 U.S. 331 (1946).
331 U.S. 367 (1947).
338 U.S. 912 (1950).

threatens the fairness
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of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must
remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies
in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice
at its inception. The courts must take such steps by rule
and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel
for defense, the accused witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court
should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration
between counsel and the press as to information affecting the
fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation,
but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.
The Sheppard case was not a proceeding against a newspaper
but was a habeas corpus proceeding by Dr Sheppard based on his
contention that his conviction was unfair "because of the trial
judge's failure to protect Sheppard sufficiently from the massive,
pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosectuion."
The Court's opinion at one point stated that the justices "do not
consider what sanctions might be available against a recalcitrant
" The remarks first quoted above are obiter dicta. But
press.
the Court's word concerning available sanctions seems to indicate
that the question still remains open as to some discipline "against
a recalcitrant press," which collaborates with counsel for either side
or with enforcement officers or other public officers to an extent
affecting the fairness of a criminal trial.

